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The Inescapable Weaknesses of Modern 
Liberal Constitutionalism 
Richard A. Epstein† 
My thesis is that modern progressive or social-democratic liberal constitution-
alism invites economic decline and political polarization, even if it avoids the mas-
sive institutional rot that pervades authoritarian regimes. Its key omission is its 
conscious decision not to specify the protected individual rights, of which individual 
autonomy, private property, and contractual freedom are key. Yet ironically, not one 
of these is typically listed in the standard human-rights statutes, which instead fo-
cus on three different factors: positive rights to education, health, and housing; over-
coming the widening inequality of wealth; and demarcating an ever-larger list of 
improper grounds for discrimination. Regrettably, the modern progressive hunt for 
social-democratic rights becomes a major source of its own undoing. Indeed, its 
wholesale indifference to the classical liberal agenda will tend to close off avenues 
for personal and economic advancement, and thus fuel the rise of the dangerous 
populism and intolerance on both the left and the right, leading to a decline of re-
spect for the democratic institutions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Professors Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq, and Mila Versteeg 
(GHV) have written a mile-a-minute, and decidedly one-sided, ac-
count of the decline and fall of liberal constitutionalism through-
out the world in the past generation. There is of course much to 
lament in the recent trends in world affairs, which have shown as 
of late a depressing tendency to reward authoritarian and bank-
rupt regimes across the globe. Many of the traditional bastions 
of liberal constitutionalism have fallen on hard times. Inside the 
European Union there are high levels of instability on a variety 
of fronts. The repeated monetary crises in the PIIGS—Portugal, 
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Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain1—have created endless tensions 
with Germany, which has emerged as the dominant financial and 
political EU power. Closer to home, the surprising decision of the 
United Kingdom to leave the European Union in June 2016 offers 
further evidence of the breakdown in the establishment’s domi-
nance. That development was matched by the surprise election of 
Donald Trump as president of the United States, which has led to 
intense and prolonged clashes between progressives and con-
servatives. The nonstop gyrations of the Trump administration 
on everything from immigration reform to national security to 
healthcare give little reason for optimism. And it takes no genius 
or learned empirical study to see that the situations on the ground 
in China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Russia, Syria, Turkey, and 
Venezuela are surely worse than they were a decade ago, given 
the potent mix of political tyranny on the one side and economic 
backsliding on the other. Cuba is scarcely any better. 
That said, it is important at the very least to draw this simple 
distinction: there are places where liberal constitutionalism has 
failed because it has never been tried; and there are places where 
liberal constitutionalism has failed, or at least has come under 
stress, because it has been tried and has been found wanting. In 
this short Essay, I will address the latter and ignore the former, 
except to say that authoritarian rule is not made more palatable 
when dressed up in either constitutional rhetoric or democratic 
clothing. But what is critical is that the nub of the problem is that 
so-called liberal constitutionalism has little in common with clas-
sical liberal constitutions that prioritize the protection of rights 
of property and contract. Instead, most liberal constitutions today 
allow (but rarely require) governments to offer a broad array of 
positive rights to housing, education, and healthcare, which, 
given the low level of economic productivity in such regimes, are 
better regarded as aspirational rather than strictly enforceable. 
Scarce government resources are routinely dissipated by convert-
ing competitive markets into monopolistic ones by imposing entry 
barriers and regulating wages and prices. 
My thesis is that modern progressive or social-democratic 
liberal constitutionalism invites economic decline and political 
polarization, even if it avoids the massive institutional rot that 
pervades authoritarian regimes. Much of the sharp criticism that 
 
 1 See Stephen Beard, Eurozone Hopes PIIGS May Fly (Marketplace, Aug 3, 2017), 
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GHV deliver against Brexit and the Trump administration over-
looks the simple point that these protest movements have taken 
place in large measure because of the failure of the progressive 
and human-rights agenda of liberal constitutionalism that GHV 
defend and that I have long opposed.2 In broad strokes, they speak 
about the need to protect some unspecified enumeration of indi-
vidual rights through judicial review, along with commitments to 
the rule of law that are intended to cabin the operation of the mod-
ern administrative state.3 At one point, this liberal-democratic 
synthesis was thought, erroneously, to be so stable that it led 
Francis Fukuyama to speak, prematurely it seems, of the “end of 
history,” because “there are no serious ideological competitors left 
to liberal democracy.”4 In this optimistic scenario, one authorita-
tive and stable institutional equilibrium is believed to work for a 
diverse range of nations with vastly different ethnicities, geogra-
phies, economies, histories, political traditions, and religions. 
Given the large differences among the types of states that 
need some workable constitutional order, any ostensible claim for 
universality on matters of structure should be suspect on its face. 
This is particularly true with respect to the structural features of 
any constitution. GHV are clearly right to note that the usual list 
of protective devices—federalism, separation of powers, judicial 
review, and electoral reform—do not offer, either alone or in com-
bination, a magic bullet that will solve political ills of complex 
modern societies.5 Federalism cannot work in many small coun-
tries for the simple reason that subunits are extremely difficult to 
create and maintain unless there is already some strong territo-
rial division in place prior to the formation of the federation, as in 
Switzerland. It did, after a fashion, work with the separation of 
India from Pakistan in 1947 and the division of Ireland into 
Northern Ireland, which remained with the United Kingdom, 
and Ireland, which has remained independent since 1921. More 
specifically, nations with strong religious divisions may need, if 
separation is not an option, elaborate structural constraints to 
 
 2 For one of many such accounts, see generally Richard A. Epstein, How Progres-
sives Rewrote the Constitution (Cato 2006) (detailing how progressivism undermined the 
Framers’ vision of limited federal powers). 
 3 See generally Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq, and Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of 
Liberal Constitutionalism?, 85 U Chi L Rev 239 (2018). 
 4 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 211 (Free Press 1992), 
quoted in Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 240 n 3 (cited in note 3). 
 5 See Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 248–49 (cited in note 3). 
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prevent them from being ripped apart by internal strife, as hap-
pened in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. 
In this Essay, however, I put structural issues to one side. 
Instead, I want to address what I regard as the key omission in 
their formulation of liberal democracy—namely, their conscious 
decision not to specify the protected individual rights. To my 
mind, the key building blocks of any free society begin with the 
acceptance of notions of individual autonomy, private property, 
and contractual freedom, none of which GHV mention by name, 
and none of which is typically listed in the standard human-rights 
statutes, which tend to worry much more about creating positive 
rights to education, health, and housing; overcoming the widen-
ing inequality of wealth; and demarcating an ever-larger list of 
improper grounds for discrimination. In my view, the modern pro-
gressive hunt for social-democratic rights embedded in the sup-
posed liberal constitution is a major source of its own undoing. 
Indeed, this wholesale indifference to the classical liberal agenda, 
with its effort to expand, not foreclose, opportunities for personal 
and economic advancement, has much to do with the rise of pop-
ulism on both the left and the right, as well as the decline of 
respect for the democratic institutions and practices that GHV 
detailed in their Essay. In Part I of this Essay, I briefly set out 
what I regard as the fundamentals of a sound constitutional 
order. In Part II, I explain why the rejection of this agenda has 
led to the effort to find scapegoats for the economic stagnation and 
political resentments attributable to the central tenets of liberal 
constitutionalism. 
I.  BACK TO FUNDAMENTALS 
The familiar rights of personal autonomy, private property, 
and contractual freedom form the starting point of any sound 
social structure. These key notions are not a set of absolutes that 
must always be respected, come what may. But by the same to-
ken, these rights are sufficiently central that they should not be 
overridden for weak or overtly political reasons. 
In brief, the basic argument runs as follows. As a matter of 
general economic theory, the best way to maximize human wel-
fare writ large is to first limit the use of force and fraud and then 
to encourage and foster cooperation and competition in the mar-
kets for goods, services, and ideas. This last element applies not 
only to profit-making activities, but also to the full range of reli-
gious, social, and charitable activities. Force and competition in 
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all of these areas are polar opposites for this simple reason: force 
is a negative-sum game; in contrast, cooperation and competition 
are positive-sum games. Increase the number of players in a com-
petitive market—players whose only weapons are offers of supe-
rior goods, lower prices, better terms, and greater personal and 
spiritual satisfaction—and the overall level of social welfare goes 
up. Increase the number of persons who are free to use force and 
fraud at will, and life itself becomes “solitary, poore, nasty, brut-
ish, and short.”6 It is hard to imagine any successful normative 
order that does not put the control of aggression and the protec-
tion of cooperative and competitive behavior at the top of the list 
of collective social obligations. The common protectionist response 
to protect some groups by tariffs only hurts others, and it also 
removes the important external check on the weaknesses of the 
domestic market, which shrinks under the weight of its own entry 
barriers and transfer payments, all too easily leading to an 
“America First” attitude that cuts out international trade and 
cooperation. 
In order to achieve that objective, it is necessary to adopt a 
two-part agenda. First, it is necessary to develop rules that con-
trol not only the use of force but its close relatives, such as the 
setting of traps and the using of poison. It also becomes important 
to understand that each individual is both an autonomous agent 
who is responsible for his or her own actions and one who is enti-
tled to reap the gains that come from the acquisition of property 
and the creation of successful contractual and social relations. 
The respect of these rights is a vast improvement over any social 
or pre-social order that imposes no limits on aggressive forms of 
human behavior. This control thus represents a decisive first step 
out of a state of nature, both historically and normatively, which 
is why these rules have been, since Roman times, said to be based 
on a natural law that applied across time and across nations.7 It 
 
 6 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 89 (Cambridge 1991) (Richard Tuck, ed) (originally 
published 1651). 
 7 See Gaius, The Institutes of Gaius: Part I bk I, § 1 (Clarendon 1946) (Francis de 
Zulueta, ed). This theme is picked up in Joseph Story, Natural Law, in Francis Lieber, ed, 
2 Encyclopedia Americana 151 (1844): 
We call those rights natural, which belong to all mankind, and result from our 
very nature and condition; such are a man’s right to his life, limbs and liberty, 
to the produce of his personal labor, at least to the extent of his present wants, 
and to the use, in common with the rest of mankind, of air, light, water, and the 
common means of subsistence. 
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may well be that there are complex differences in structural pro-
tections across the globe, but the set of fundamental individual 
rights exhibits far less variation, such that, comparatively, most 
of the different variations that one sees across systems reflect dif-
ficult substantive choices that cause as much difficulty within 
systems as across them.8 
This set of natural rights functions only as an initial baseline 
from which further gains are possible, both by voluntary private 
contract and public action. The former is easy enough to under-
stand. Any private voluntary transaction generates mutual gains 
for the parties, for otherwise, why enter into it? More importantly, 
as a general matter the externalities from trade are positive for 
third persons, except in a few cases (conspiracies to kill or steal, 
or to restrain trade, which are accordingly proscribed). But in ad-
dition to these contract rules, there are at least four key areas in 
which private property rights may be appropriately limited. The 
first is that the rules of occupation that work for the original ac-
quisition of land, animals, and chattels do not work for rivers and 
beaches, where the basic formulation of property rights is in-
verted: these are ius communes, common resources from which 
everyone has the right not to be excluded, given their necessity 
for human communication and transportation.9 There is no cred-
ible argument that the right of a single person to dam a river and 
bottle the water produces enough social gain to outweigh the re-
sult that water no longer moves in its customary path.10 Second, 
the presumptive exclusivity of private property can be breached 
under conditions of necessity, defined as those involving an immi-
nent loss to person or property. Third, social order requires cen-
tralized resources, so it is perfectly acceptable to tax individuals 
on their labor and property in order to provide for the common 
defense, the preservation of internal order, and needed social in-
frastructure. But at the same time, it is critical to curb abusive 
transfers from taxation, such that in a classical liberal society the 
ends for taxation are largely limited to the provision of public 
goods. In addition, the source of taxation extends over a broad 
 
 8 For a nice demonstration in connection with the tension between the original 
owner and the bona fide purchaser, see generally Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity 
in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J Legal Stud 43 (1987). 
 9 See Justinian, The Institutes of Justinian bk 1, title II, ¶ 1 (Oxford 4th ed 1906) 
(J.B. Moyle, trans). 
 10 See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights in Water, Spectrum, and Minerals, 86 U 
Colo L Rev 389, 399–400 (2015). 
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base of labor and property transactions, preferably through a flat 
tax on either consumption or income.11 (I prefer the former.) 
Fourth, while the state may condemn private property, the emi-
nent domain power should be exercised sparingly and only for the 
acquisition of particular properties needed to supply public func-
tions, and only upon payment of just compensation equal to the 
value of the property to its private owner, plus compensation for 
the consequential damages from the taking. These rules allow 
governments to operate when they are needed, but to constrain 
public officials from singling out friends for special favors and 
enemies for special burdens, thereby constraining the famous 
rent-seeking problem that leads to faction and discord in modern 
western democracies that have abandoned these principles.12 
Given these strong rights considerations, structural protec-
tions have a far greater chance of success than do the delineation 
of rights implicit in the modern theories of liberal constitutional-
ism, which regard all of these substantive constraints as nettle-
some interferences with the rights of government to advance 
some general benevolent conception of society writ large, often as 
determined by experts responding to some general democratic 
command.13 One familiar example of liberal constitutionalism is 
to supply each person with a minimum level of social security, as 
with the American Social Security system—the choice of name is 
a matter of political brilliance—that guarantees some minimum 
standard of support that goes well beyond the protection of all 
individuals from aggression by others. Even small-government 
thinkers like F.A. Hayek, writing less than a decade after Social 
Security was established, spoke of two kinds of security, which 
“are, first, security against severe physical privation, the cer-
tainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all; and, second, the 
 
 11 See Richard A. Epstein, We Need a Real Flat Tax (Hoover Institution, Oct 13, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5GXW-864L: 
The flat tax . . . offers the most attractive option, because it allows the govern-
ment to set the overall levels of revenue as high or as low as seems necessary, 
without inviting various factions to game the system for partisan advantage. 
The flat tax also tends to reduce the overall tax burden, because people are on 
average more reluctant to raise taxes on others if they have to raise them on 
themselves. 
 12 For the classic statement, see generally James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The 
Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Michigan 1962). 
 13 For an early defense of the administrative state written just after the American 
constitutional revolution of 1937, see James Landis, The Administrative Process 46 
(Greenwood 1938). 
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security of a given standard of life, or of the relative position 
which one person or group enjoys compared with others.”14 
In practice, however, this distinction is only one of degree. 
The sharper difference is between providing protection against 
the aggression of others and offering any positive state benefits. 
The classical liberal theory kept to this line, and sought, with 
some serious success, to handle the question of minimum secu-
rity, as Justice Joseph Story wrote, through “imperfect” obliga-
tions of benevolence, in contrast to the perfect rights to liberty 
and property, that are required as a matter of conscience and of 
social convention for people to aid those in need, as by tithing or 
charitable constitution.15 The difference between these two ap-
proaches is enormous, because there is far less room for slippage 
under the classical liberal conception as articulated by Story than 
under the Hayekian view, in which the social minimums can, 
and have, creep up for all sorts of reasons, as with Medicare and 
Medicaid in the American context. 
From the guarded Hayekian position, it is easy to observe the 
slippage to a more robust version of positive rights that covers 
health care and unemployment insurance.16 Most modern writers 
do not have Hayek’s obvious ambivalence toward the creation of 
these positive rights.17 So in most progressive circles, the class of 
affirmative rights goes far further, weakening the protection of 
property rights by allowing politically motivated legislatures to 
redistribute property and opportunity among its citizens. It is not 
possible here to give a full account of how this transformation of 
rights theory emerged, but it is useful to pick up on a key element 
that passes without complaint from GHV, who take it for granted 
that a liberal constitutional order protects “the right to unionize,” 
without stressing what correlative duties individuals have with 
regard to this newly asserted right and why.18 That right is of 
course found, along with other positive rights, in the UN Universal 
 
 14 F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 133 (Chicago 1944). 
 15 See Story, Natural Law at 151 (cited in note 7) (emphasis omitted). Note that his 
treatment is heavily theistic and does not offer any theoretical grounding for rules that 
have in fact huge functional advantages. 
 16 For my criticism of Hayek on these grounds, see Richard A. Epstein, Hayekian 
Socialism, 58 Md L Rev 271, 298–99 (1999). 
 17 See generally, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s 
Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More Than Ever (Basic Books 2004). 
 18 Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 251 (cited in note 3). 
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Declaration of Human Rights.19 In ambition, the UN delineation 
matches the parallel claims for universality of the natural law. 
But in its content it is far more dangerous, as it contains the seeds 
for the breakdown of the liberal-democratic order. 
It is easy to see how an impasse can arise if the UN decla-
ration (and similar pronouncements) sets the ground rules for 
employment relations. The Trade Disputes Act of 190620 led to 
massive distortion of labor markets that, before Margaret 
Thatcher became prime minister, severely retarded labor-market 
growth. The National Labor Relations Act21 (NLRA) in the United 
States had less dire consequences, but it allowed the strike wave 
in the aftermath of World War II to create profound labor-market 
dislocations that were only partially negated by the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act22 in 1947. The UN declaration does not specify 
whom the correlative duties fall on, what they are, and why they 
are imposed. There are no obvious limits on what can be done 
under this framework, and in the labor markets, this result can 
easily lead to a system in which jobs become so protected that 
dismissal, if it is obtainable at all, requires compliance with oner-
ous administrative procedures, in contrast to the common-law 
rule that allows people to enter into contracts at will, and with 
respect to all future services an employee may quit and an em-
ployer may fire for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. 
The breakdown in European labor markets stems from just 
 
 19 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly (Dec 10, 1948), 
UN Doc A/RES/217A 75: 
Article 23 
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and fa-
vorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal 
work. 
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensur-
ing for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and sup-
plemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests. 
 20 6 Edw 7 ch 47, reprinted in 44 The Public General Statutes 246 (Eyre & 
Spottiswoode 1906). 
 21 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC § 151 et seq. 
 22 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat 136, codified at 29 USC 
§§ 141–87. 
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these restrictions, which among their many vices create a privi-
leged in-class that cannot be dislodged, necessarily leaving scant 
opportunities for those who are shut out of the market.23 
These dangerous developments stand in sharp contrast with 
classical natural-rights theory, in which private property imposes 
on all individuals the duty to forbear from entering or destroying 
it, regardless of their wealth or social status. These traditional 
rights are largely invariant to three key elements: the size of the 
population, the change in overall wealth, and changes in technol-
ogy.24 This set of rights is easily knowable and enforceable, and it 
does not suffer from uncertain transitions and redefinitions that 
are part and parcel of the modern administrative state, for which 
tinkering with statutory commands is a daily part of the overall 
vision. 
Wholly apart from its indefinite structure, the modern ver-
sion of positive rights for workers omits any explicit (or indeed 
implicit) reference to the simple proposition that unions seek to 
raise wages by exercising monopoly power over the labor markets 
of which they are a part, for which at one time they were subject 
by the Supreme Court to the antitrust laws in the United States.25 
But that legal regime did not last. Unions received immunity from 
the operation of the antitrust laws under the Trade Disputes Act 
in England of 190626 and under § 6 of the Clayton Act.27 To make 
 
 23 See Elena Holodny, This Chart Highlights One of Europe’s Biggest Problems 
(Business Insider, Nov 9, 2017), online at http://www.businessinsider.com/youth 
-unemployment-europe-eu-2017-11 (visited Jan 23, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) 
(comparing Europe’s overall unemployment rate of 8.9 percent to the unemployment rate 
for youth ages 15 to 24 of 18.7 percent as of September 2017). 
 24 For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public 
Administration, and the Rule of Law 73–76 (Harvard 2011). 
 25 See Loewe v Lawlor, 208 US 274, 306–09 (1908). Loewe was part of a consistent 
intellectual order, which included such decisions as Adair v United States, 208 US 161, 
180 (1908) (striking down a federal collective bargaining law); Coppage v Kansas, 236 US 
1, 26 (1915) (striking down a state collective bargaining law); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co v 
Mitchell, 245 US 229, 261–62 (1917) (finding that inducement of breach of contract lies 
against unions). For my unrepentant defense of the old order, see generally Richard A. 
Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legisla-
tion, 92 Yale L J 1357 (1983). 
 26 6 Edw 7 ch 47 § 4, reprinted in 44 The Public General Statutes at 246–47 (cited in 
note 20). 
 27 38 Stat 730, 731 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 17: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing 
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and 
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the 
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or 
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the point more broadly, the overgeneralized vision of liberal de-
mocracy grants full legitimacy to those states that foster and pro-
tect monopoly power in some areas while denying it in others, and 
thus allows radically different rules to apply to concentration of 
power by firms and unions. In the United States, the adoption of 
the NLRA in 1935 led to a massive strike wave after the end of 
the Second World War,28 which in turn led to legislation—the 
Administrative Procedure Act29 and the Taft-Hartley Act—that 
tempered the force of union power so that it did not lead to the 
breakdown of the state. But England was not so lucky, for the 
labor market almost broke the country when Margaret Thatcher 
became prime minister.30 There is no way that any liberal de-
mocracy can hope to prosper if it turns over that level of monop-
oly power to one of its groups. What happened in England in 
1980 is happening again today: the success or failure of President 
Emmanuel Macron’s new French government will turn on 
whether he is able to reform the rigid labor laws by making it 
easier to hire and fire.31 
Today, in many markets, unions are not the main source of 
dislocation, but other systems of regulation, minimum wages, 
maximum hours, family leave, required healthcare coverage, and 
antidiscrimination laws contribute to labor-market rigidity that 
liberal constitutionalists tend to ignore, just as they ignore the 
powerful empirical evidence that the period of greatest prosperity 
and economic growth—roughly speaking, 1870 to 1940 in the 
United States32—corresponded perfectly with the classical liberal 
constitutional order that has always attracted the scorn of liberal 
constitutionalists, which includes not only progressives but also 
many traditional conservatives who continue to think that 
 
to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully car-
rying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the 
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies 
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 
 28 See midtowng, The Great Strike Wave of 1946 (Economic Populist, Apr 5, 2009), 
archived at http://perma.cc/W3WU-SCPP. 
 29 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. 
 30 See Adam Taylor, Margaret Thatcher Fought One Huge Battle That Changed the 
UK Forever (Business Insider, Apr 8, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc//6NT2-GVHT. 
 31 For a discussion of the issue, see Chloe Farand, Emmanuel Macron Kicks Off Con-
troversial Attempt to Reform France’s Labour Laws (The Independent, June 28, 2017), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/RD94-FV76. 
 32 For the empirical evidence, see Robert Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American 
Growth 25–318 (Princeton 2016). 
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Lochner v New York33 was an unmitigated constitutional disas-
ter.34 Tellingly, the word “growth” never appears in GHV’s ac-
count of liberal constitutionalism. And yet it is precisely the lack 
of growth, combined with the manifest rise of the political corrup-
tion in a large state, that has led to widespread disenchantment 
in both the United States and the European Union. Nor should 
these developments come as any surprise. When times are bad, 
groups look at the jobs that are lost and hope for some protection-
ist maneuver to shield them from foreign shocks. But in virtually 
all cases, the gains from free trade across national borders will, if 
allowed to flourish, swamp these parochial maneuvers, at least if 
it can overcome a broadscale consensus that includes in the 
United States such notables as President Trump, Hillary Clinton, 
and Senator Bernie Sanders, and of course union groups that see 
free trade as the mortal enemy of their monopoly wages. 
On this issue, there should be a powerful litmus test that 
rules these protectionist motives out of bounds. To be sure, there 
are always cases in which restriction on the import or export of 
goods may well be justified.35 Excluding toxic goods is perfectly 
acceptable so long as it is not a ruse for protectionist activities. 
But abuse of this principle is rampant, as when the European 
Union invokes the precautionary principle to impose strict re-
strictions on GMOs,36 notwithstanding a complete lack of evi-
dence that they are harmful. Similarly, requiring export licenses 
for advanced goods with clear implications for national security is 
yet another important exception to the general rule. However, 
most such restrictions are intended to secure advantages for local 
producers, but can do so only at the expense of local consumers 
and local manufacturers who need to import goods and services 
from overseas in order to remain competitive as sellers of goods 
and providers of services in both domestic and international mar-
kets. GHV’s definition of liberal constitutionalism is consistent 
with strongly anti-free-trade positions precisely because it makes 
no substantive commitments on individual rights, and thus opens 
 
 33 198 US 45 (1905). 
 34 See, for example, Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584, 2621 (2015) (Roberts dis-
senting) (referring to “the debacle of the Lochner era”). For a rather different account, see 
David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against Progres-
sive Reform 8–39 (Chicago 2011). 
 35 For a good treatment of these issues, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Art XX, 55 UNTS 194, 262–63, TIAS 1700 (1947) (GATT). 
 36 Theresa Papademetriou, Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: European 
Union (Library of Congress, March 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WG3D-CSG5. 
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the way for the advancement of the wrong rights, like those in the 
UN declaration, that create extensive cross subsidies, restraints 
on entry, and other forms of monopoly power. 
A similar difficulty arises in connection with the knotty ques-
tion of redistribution of wealth through state action. It is difficult, 
even within the framework of classical liberalism, to argue that 
any system of redistribution should be banned as a matter of first 
principle, given the case for at least a set of imperfect obliga-
tions. But it is important to note that one of the great difficulties 
of modern social life stems from the size of the redistributive state 
insofar as it provides massive subsidies for pensions, healthcare, 
education, and housing that are not supportable by resources 
available to the public. Yet it is important to note that there are 
some important ways to curb the strong appetite for these subsi-
dies even when they are state provided. 
First, it is always a mistake to fund various transfer pay-
ments from specific taxes on unrelated businesses or industries. 
One recent American example of that practice was the excise tax 
imposed on medical devices under Obamacare, suspended for two 
years, which imposed huge costs on one particular industry.37 The 
invariable rule in these cases is that welfare benefits should come 
from general revenues so that their cost is brought to bear, how-
ever imperfectly, by the parties who support the program. The use 
of general revenues thus helps steady the political game of in-
trigue that arises when all interest groups seek to duck potential 
liabilities with the same enthusiasm that they seek to attract spe-
cial benefits. But even here, so long as there are no constraints on 
the objects for which taxes can be spent, huge transfers, as 
through pension programs, can negate many of these benefits. It 
is a sobering reminder that a state like Illinois has both huge un-
funded pension liabilities and a flat state income tax.38 
Second, it is never proper to seek to raise moneys for these 
programs by making an aggressive use of governmental powers 
to license or permit. One of many examples is the requirement 
that the builders of new properties for sale or lease agree to re-
serve some fraction of their new supply for affordable residences. 
The conceit is that they can always make up the difference by 
 
 37 Medical Device Tax Suspended for Two Years (AAMI, Dec 21, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/RY2H-M84U. 
 38 For the juxtaposition, see Mike Klemens and Ralph Martire, Illinois Issues: Flat 
vs. Graduated Income Tax (NPR Illinois, Aug 24, 2017), archived at 
http://www.perma.cc/G6WJ-HDCR. 
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raising the price on the market-rate units in the mix. The reality 
is that the burden on sales and rentals operates like an indirect 
form of price control that reduces the private willingness to invest 
in the first place, leading to systematic housing shortages, which 
become especially acute when the rates are set too high for busi-
nesses to continue. A similar risk arises in the United States in 
connection with the Community Reinvestment Act of 197739 
(CRA) and similar programs that insist that large subsidies be 
poured into underserved neighborhoods for banks that wish to ex-
pand their operations by opening branches or acquiring local 
banks.40 These obligations clearly spilled over into lending mar-
kets, in which it was, and is, impossible to expand high-risk loans 
without impairing the safety and security of the member banks.41 
These pressures (along with the lack of appreciation of correlated 
risks) helped bring about the collapse of the mortgage market in 
2007 and 2008, which once again affirms the importance of im-
posing some strong constraint on redistributive politics. The mon-
etary consequences of off-budget changes are not made explicit 
until it is too late. Yet the standard model of liberal constitution-
alism has nothing to say in opposition to that practice. 
It might well be said that these examples are all too anecdo-
tal, and in a sense they are. But within the United States the ev-
idence from competitive federalism supports the same point by 
looking at the aggregate impact of taxation and regulation on in-
dividual behavior, here in the context of the movement of popula-
tions across state lines. On this matter, there is no contest: the 
migration moves from high-tax, high-regulation states to low-tax, 
low-regulation states. One recent study notes that the outmigra-
tion from high-tax, high-regulation states virtually matches the 
in-migration to low-tax states—the bottom ten states have lost 
about 3.78 million people over the last decade, while the top ten 
have gained about 3.75 million.42 The differences are all the more 
impressive because both groups of states have to struggle with 
 
 39 Pub L No 95-128, 91 Stat 1147, codified at 12 USC § 2901 et seq. 
 40 For a critique, see Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community 
Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 Va L Rev 291, 294–97 (1993) (arguing that 
the Act does “more harm than good”). 
 41 For an analysis of the impact of the CRA, see Sumit Agarwal, et al, Did the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? *21 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 18609, Dec 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/DQM3-4T54. 
 42 See Jonathan Williams, Business-Friendly States Are Growing at the Expense of 
Those That Tax and Spend (National Review, Apr 22, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FAM4-8VJ3. 
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the same large system of federal regulation, so that the differ-
ences in total impact are smaller than those that would arise if 
the only determinant of economic success were the state regula-
tion. It is not possible to present more exhaustive data here, but 
it is possible to insist that the flaw in modern liberal constitution-
alism lies in this compound failure: it first shrinks the economic 
base, then increases the transfer payments that it runs on that 
base. The point here is not that maximum productivity and zero 
redistribution are the ideal mix. Nor is it that all states must fall 
from grace if they make any concession on either margin. It is 
rather that there is likely to be a continuum in practices, such 
that the cumulative impact of increases in regulation, taxation, 
and transfer payments carries economic risks that the defenders 
of liberal constitutionalism tend to overlook. And make no mistake 
about it, the decline of economic growth carries with it major op-
portunities for political instability, an issue to which I now turn. 
II.  FINDING SCAPEGOATS 
There are then good reasons to be pessimistic about the fu-
ture of liberal constitutionalism in the face of rising populism. But 
in light of the above analysis it is necessary to recognize why so 
many of the populist forces are strongly opposed to the system, 
given its defense of the wrong right. In this regard, it is important 
to comment on one particular passage, which contains in my view 
some truth but much error about the behavior of the opponents of 
that system. That passage reads in full: 
By the end of 2016, however, it was not merely possible, but 
even en vogue for aspiring politicians to question the hegem-
ony of liberal democracy. Although warning signs aplenty 
might now be discerned, it is possible to single out the June 
2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the 
November 2016 presidential election in the United States as 
marking, in different ways, globally resonant repudiations of 
the liberal-democratic norm. 
 In both contests, right-of-center populist positions hostile 
to international migration, international and supranational 
organizations, and the liberal tolerance of different ethnici-
ties and faiths prevailed. Their triumphs were part of a 
wider, right-leaning “populist explosion” in Europe and Asia, 
albeit one that trails an earlier left-leaning populist shift in 
Latin America. Although they have typically ascended to 
power via democratic, electoral means, populists on both the 
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left and right have departed from liberal-democratic norms 
in several ways.43 
I am not sure whether GHV would have written this passage 
in exactly the same way today. But I take strong exception to the 
claim that Brexit has unleashed strongly antidemocratic and in-
tolerant forces. The vote itself was very close—less than four 
points separated the two sides—which makes perfectly good 
sense because the case was close: there are advantages in remain-
ing in the European Union as part of a free-trade zone, but less 
insofar as it operates as a central government capable of issuing 
binding law on its member nations.44 Anyone who has followed 
Prime Minister Theresa May knows that she has tried to preserve 
cooperative relations with the European Union, by endorsing 
three of its four critical freedoms: the free movement of capital, 
goods, and services. Even though the UK decision to leave the 
European Union was irrevocable, the United Kingdom hoped to 
preserve “the deep and special partnership” as the European 
Union’s “closest friend and neighbour.”45 The movement of people 
within the European Union raises far more complex issues, but is 
orthogonal to the explosive issue of immigration and refugees, 
which under the EU agreements is left for individual member 
states to decide for themselves.46 The UK motivations for pulling 
out of the European Union were mixed, but high on that list was 
the belief that the European Union trampled on sensible British 
parliamentary autonomy.47 Much sovereign power was trans-
ferred to the European Commission, a remote and unsympathetic 
body that was all too keen on intervening in the United Kingdom’s 
affairs.48 
 
 43 Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 240–41 (citations omitted) (cited 
in note 3). 
 44 For my views, see generally Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Exit Rights: What 
the Theory of the Firm Says about the Conduct of Brexit Negotiations, 39 Cardozo L Rev 
(forthcoming 2018). 
 45 Theresa May, Prime Minister’s Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article 50 
(gov.uk, Mar 29, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/N28X-6S4S. 
 46 Explaining the Rules (European Commission, June 12, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YX9K-KWPR. 
 47 See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Brexit Vote Is about the Supremacy of Parliament 
and Nothing Else: Why I Am Voting to Leave the EU (The Telegraph, June 13, 2016), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/25TZ-GYWV. 
 48 Joshua Rozenberg, Does the EU Impact on UK Sovereignty? (BBC, Feb 23, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/QKU7-RMPT. 
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Next, the Brexiters chafed at the United Kingdom’s inability 
to enter into free-trade agreements with non-EU members, includ-
ing the United States, Australia, and other parts of the British 
Commonwealth.49 Brexiters have no objection to remaining in the 
World Trade Organization, whose rules will govern the relation-
ship between the European Union and the United Kingdom if no 
separation arrangement is concluded under the Article 50 frame-
work before the clock runs out on March 29, 2019.50 The extent 
to which EU regulation bears major responsibility for the 
United Kingdom’s own problems is an open question. Indeed, 
many Remainers believe that access to European markets are 
well worth the regulatory burdens that might be imposed. Yet at 
the same time, many Remainers were left-wing Labour Party 
members under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. His political 
star rose after May frittered away her legislative majority.51 It is 
also worth noting that leading voices inside the European Union, 
most notably that of Michel Barnier, its chief negotiator, have to 
date shown little willingness to address new treaty relationships 
going forward until the United Kingdom satisfies its debts to the 
European Union on key matters of budget commitments, pension 
liabilities, loan guarantees, and EU spending on UK projects.52 
Barnier puts that figure at the tidy sum of €60 billion (£51 bil-
lion).53 It is a grotesque overstatement to claim that Brexiters are 
closet supporters of Carl Schmitt, driven by their desire to wipe 
out their enemies by physical force if necessary.54 Indeed, the 
success or failure of Brexit will depend on whether and how the 
European Union and United Kingdom negotiate some follow-on 
deal. 
 
 49 See Peter Lilley, The Truth about Britain’s Trade outside the European Union (The 
Telegraph, May 26, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8DWZ-DNE8. 
 50 See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union Art 50, 55 J EU C326 
13, 43–44 (2012). 
 51 See John Curtice, Theresa May Failed to Gain a Majority Because She Grossly 
Misunderstood the ‘Will of the People’ (The Independent, June 9, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2JMP-NVL6. 
 52 See Michel Barnier, The Conditions for Reaching an Agreement in the Negotiations 
with the United Kingdom (European Commission, Mar 22, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/BPA9-T9QQ. 
 53 See Will Martin, The EU Expects to Spend a Massive Chunk of the Article 50 Period 
Negotiating a Single Element of Brexit (Business Insider, Feb 20, 2017), archived at 
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 54 See Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 241 (cited in note 3). 
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President Trump is always more difficult to analyze. To say 
that he is a divisive force is to understate the obvious. It was ap-
propriate to wince at his jingoistic “America First” inaugural ad-
dress and his indefensible first order on the entry of noncitizens 
into the United States, both of which led me to call at the time for 
his resignation.55 After relative quiescence on this issue, his “hire 
American and buy American”56 line is a form of protectionist folly 
that has to be opposed every step of the way. His now-futile efforts 
to tie up the entire budget process until he got funding for his 
Mexico wall makes many people, myself included, pine for a 
Republican administration headed by Vice President Mike Pence. 
Finally, his endless personal indiscretions, abusive and mindless 
tweets, nasty insults, and other erratic behaviors make him less 
than an ideal presidential figure. 
Yet it is a mistake to ignore the positive side of the ledger. 
Trump has appointed many highly competent people—think 
National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster. On the political front, 
Trump has done many things that are right, including allowing 
the construction of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines. 
He did so in ways that corrected the legal shenanigans of the 
Obama administration, especially on Dakota Access (a case in 
which I worked as a consultant for a consortium of labor and busi-
ness groups supporting the pipeline). At times the Obama admin-
istration took actions that were a massive affront to the most 
rudimentary requirements of the rule of law, including its unprec-
edented government refusal to enforce a judgment in their favor 
that had been issued by Obama-appointed district-court judge 
James Boasberg after painstaking deliberations.57 Thereafter the 
assistant secretary in the Department of the Army refused to 
issue the necessary permit for an easement over a small tract of 
government land, even after the Air Corps of Engineers had found 
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that the easement met all regulatory standards.58 Trump was also 
right in my view to pull out of the ill-conceived Paris accords.59 On 
the international front Trump has, at least for the moment, come 
around to the view that we should take at least some modest steps 
to stop the carnage in Syria, and, hard as it is, reaffirm the im-
portance of NATO and drop charges of currency manipulation 
against the Chinese in order to get some leverage over them with 
respect to North Korea.60 The man is too difficult to capture in a 
broad denunciation that lacks any bill of particulars. 
Finally, GHV misunderstand much of the support of Trump 
just as they misunderstand the appeal of Brexit. Trump’s support 
was nourished by a widespread hostility, if not downright revul-
sion, toward Hillary Clinton, his rival. She had the support of the 
fashionable eastern elites and was solidly progressive on every 
issue from race to campaign finance to taxes to crime. Yet her 
natural base was wary of her because of her involvement in 
Whitewater, Travelgate, Benghazi, and of course the multiple is-
sues surrounding her email server and former FBI Director 
James Comey’s hot-and-cold investigation of her behavior. At 
the same time, Clinton alienated massive numbers of people in 
flyover country by calling Trump supporters “deplorables” and re-
fusing to acknowledge the enormous economic reversals that hit 
people in these less privileged places.61 Nor do GHV make any 
reference to the excesses of Black Lives Matter, the shrill invec-
tives of Senator Sanders, or the left-wing protestors who have 
managed in short order to disinvite or shout down people like 
 
 58 See Courtney Kube and Daniel A. Medina, Army Corps of Engineers Had Actually 
Recommended Dakota Access Pipeline Route Approval (NBC News, Dec 7, 2016), archived 
at http://perma.cc/4UA7-248Z. 
 59 See Richard A. Epstein, Forget the Paris Accords (Hoover Institution, May 30, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/YX9Z-TSQ9. 
 60 See Stephen Collinson, Trump’s Stunning U-turns on NATO, China, Russia and 
Syria (CNN Politics, Apr 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/B8TW-JH25. 
 61 See Amy Chozick, Hillary Clinton Calls Many Trump Backers ‘Deplorables,’ and 
G.O.P. Pounces (NY Times, Sept 10, 2016), online at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/politics/hillary-clinton-basket-of-deplorables.html?mcubz=0 
(visited Oct 18, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
422 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:403 
	
Ayaan Hirsi Ali,62 Heather McDonald,63 Charles Murray,64 and the 
vile Milo Yiannopoulos.65 In the United States at least, no one 
should overlook the dangers of political extremism from the left 
as well as from the right. Put that package together and much of 
the Trump appeal was a refusal to accept the status quo of the 
modern progressive administrative state that embraces liberal 
constitutionalism. 
Yet in many ways the most troubling message of GHV’s piece 
is their relative indifference to the atrocities that have routinely 
taken place in socialist countries like China, Cuba, Russia, and 
Venezuela, which dwarf by orders of magnitude any supposed 
sins of the Brexiters or even Trump. These socialist havens fea-
ture one-man arbitrary rule that is quite willing to jail and tor-
ture dissenters, rig presidential elections, and drive an economy 
to ruin. I quite agree with GHV that peaceful mass demonstra-
tions may well be the best way to take after corrupt govern-
ments.66 And one should not look with indifference at the con-
certed long-term effort of the Chinese government to reduce the 
level of political and cultural independence in Hong Kong, where 
massive demonstrations have yet to stop the apparatchiks in 
Beijing from squeezing the life out of the region.67 Nor do they 
show much worry about the decision of the Russian autocrat 
Vladimir Putin to gobble up Crimea.68 Perspective really matters, 
and the ostensible enemies of liberal constitutionalism in the 
West are child’s play compared to the oppression, intolerance, and 
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arbitrary power in so many totalitarian regimes. The best way to 
fight them, moreover, is not to appeal to a frayed and tattered 
progressivism, but to reaffirm the dominance of liberty, property, 
limited government, and the rule of law, as properly understood 
in the classical liberal tradition. 
CONCLUSION 
In this short Essay, I have tried to pour some cold water over 
the modern claims for the intellectual dominance of liberal con-
stitutionalism. On first inspection, there seems much to like in 
liberal constitutionalism. But on closer look, the clear weaknesses 
of that position are legion. The most important of these is the gap 
in the specification of the individual rights that it seeks to defend. 
GHV have not written a defense of traditional limited govern-
ment. Instead they have penned a defense of the wrong set of 
rights, which is ultimately unstable, both for the economic stag-
nation it engenders and for its heavy reliance on unbounded ad-
ministrative interventions that, for all their procedural formali-
ties, are inconsistent with the rule of law. 
Indeed, that critical concept can be read in dramatically dif-
ferent ways. The thin version of the doctrine contains no sub-
stantive commitments and is satisfied by having neutral judges 
administering internally consistent rules generated by a suppos-
edly benign combination of popular democratic will backed by 
administrative expertise. That version will disintegrate in the 
face of constant and uncontrollable political pressures. It should 
therefore be emphatically rejected in favor of the strong concep-
tion of the rule of law that ties that conception to a particular 
substantive vision that features limited government, strong pri-
vate property rights, and freedom of contract, subject to the limi-
tations set out above. The differences between these two systems 
is enormous. The seeds for the destruction of the fashionable ver-
sions of liberal constitutionalism lie in its weak substrate of sub-
stantive rights. Stemming today’s massive unease will not come 
from an uncritical defense of an outmoded theory that rests on 
progressive principles. It lies in making strong substantive com-
mitments to the classical liberal position that is all too often over-
looked and deprecated today. 
